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# Solving **Chip Security's** Weakest Link ■

Complete Secure Boundary  
with PUF-based Hardware Root of Trust

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**PUF**security  
AN ememory COMPANY



## John Chou

Business Development and Technical Marketing Manager

For over 12 years, Mr. Chou has worked with talented teams at start-ups or high-growth Semiconductor IP companies building and promoting cutting-edge technology. He is currently responsible for market development across North America and Europe at PUFsecurity.

# Hacking is Everywhere ■

## Threat to **Life**



### **Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway**

1.4 million vehicle recall by Chrysler, the age of hackable vehicles begins.

[Link](#)

## Threat to **Privacy**



### **IoT Security Camera hacking demonstration on YouTube**

Step by step guides for hacking IoT devices are widely available online.

[Link](#)

## Threat to **Finances**




### **Colonial Pipeline pay \$4.4m to end ransomware attack**

massive shutdown of approximately half of the USA's East Coast fuel supply

[Link](#)

# Only secure as the **weakest link** .



- Insecure eFuse key storage can compromise a whole system
- Hackers always finds the weakest link to the system

# Combining Hard and Soft IPs

## Security Subsystem

### Hard Macro

(process dep.)

Anti-Tamper Design

TRNG (entropy)

OTP (Secure Storage)

PUF (Chip Fingerprint)

### Soft IP

(process indep.)

Secure CPU

HASH Crypto

Sym. Crypto

Asym Crypto

Security systems rely on OTP Memory

**Secure OTP** is replacing eFuse

Crypto engines require TRNG

**TRNG** is digital + analog

External Key injection is expensive

**PUF** has zero-touch provisioning



**PUF / OTP / TRNG / Anti-tampering**  
Combined into one single  
**Hardware Root of Trust is Ideal**

# The **Three Fundamentals** of Hardware Root of Trust ■

1. Secure Key Storage
2. Root Key Generation
3. High-Quality Entropy

# Key Storage: Insecure eFuse


- **Invisibility** means an inherent resistance to Invasive Attacks
- Low programming current → Suitable for **In-field programming**
- **High Reliability** even in advanced nodes






# Key Storage: with Secure OTP

## Anti-Fuse OTP No PUF-based Storage




## Secure OTP With PUF Protection



# Root Key: Generated by Inborn PUF


## Without PUF

### Centralized Identification



## With PUF

### De-Centralized Identification






# Root Key: from an Ideal PUF

- Process variation always exists in semiconductor devices, however, adjacent devices are nearly identical
- **NeoPUF** leverages this microscopical minute variations to achieve ideal PUF (ISSCC2019 Outstanding Paper)
- **Ideal for Inborn-Key / UID** → No need for key provisioning


## Quantum Tunneling PUF




Metric	Checked by	Ideal PUF	NeoPUF
Randomness	Hamming Weight (HW)	50%	50%
Uniqueness	Hamming Distance (HD)	50%	50%
Robustness	Bit Error Rate (BER)	0%	0% for all PVT
Helper Data	Error Correction Code	No Need	No Need
Entropy Quality	Min. entropy of bits	1	~1
Invisibility	Reversed Engineering	Untraceable	Untraceable
Manufacturability	Yield and Reliability	100%	100%, all Tech.
Radiation Hardening	Gamma Ray Radiation	Radhard	Radhard

# High-Quality Entropy: PUF-based TRNG


- **NeoPUF:** 1Kbits, pre-load into the 1K registers
- **Random Number Sets:** 32-bit LFSR combined a PUF with three ways expansion
- **Feedback System:** Output reseeds LFSR using two dynamic entropies and conditioning



# Concept of PUF-based Hardware Root of Trust



# PUFrt: PUF-based Hardware Root of Trust



## PUFrt

## Features / Benefits

### Secure Storage (8Kb)

- **Secure OTP**
- Anti-physical/electrical attack

### Integrated TRNG

- Instant ready 90b in 100us
- **Plug & Play dynamic entropy source**
- NIST SP800-90B / 800-22 compliant

### Inborn PUF (1Kb)

- **Alternative to key injection process (~\$0.5-2 per device)**
- Instant ready without helper

### Anti-Tamper


- The design and entropy will protect macro, operation and interface

### Dual Interface

- Standard APB-s Controller
- **Privileges to Secure/Non-secure**
- Customizable to TCM and TileLink


# PUFrt: The missing piece of the puzzle

## Non-Secure eFuse/OTP



- Visible eFuse
- No security policy
- Insecure channel possible fault injection, etc.

## Secure Root of Trust



- Inborn chip fingerprint by PUF
- Complete anti-tampering shell
- Comprehensive secure boundary

Thank You ■

